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Abstract 
Wireless Sensor Networks consist of small battery-limited devices called sensor 
nodes. They are used for collecting data from surrounding environment and relay them 
via wireless communication. One of the recent application areas is underwater sensing. 
Communication in Underwater Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSN) is different from 
airborne communication. Radio frequencies cannot be used for UWSN. Instead acoustic 
waves, which cause extra challenges, are used in UWSN. When UWSNs are deployed 
in hostile environment, nodes can be captured by an adversary. In order to secure 
UWSNs, firstly key distribution problem must be addressed. Moreover, UWSNs are 
inherently mobile since the nodes may be drifted in the sea.  
In this thesis, we propose a key distribution model which is applied for two group 
mobility models, namely (i) nomadic mobility model and (ii) meandering current 
mobility model. Our nomadic mobility based key distribution scheme works in three 
dimensions. However, this scheme is suitable only for small coastal areas. On the other 
hand, our meandering mobility based key distribution model is a two dimensional one 
and spans several kilometers in the open sea. In both schemes, a hierarchical structure is 
used. Secure and resilient group communication is handled via well-known Blom’s key 
distribution scheme. We analyzed the performance of the proposed schemes using 
simulations. Our results show that secure connectivity of both schemes is generally 
high. Of course, mobility causes some temporary decreases in the connectivity, but our 
schemes help to heal the connectivity performance in time.  Moreover, our schemes 
show good resiliency performance such that capture of some nodes by an adversary 
only causes very small amount of links between uncaptured nodes to be compromised. 
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Özet 
Kablosuz Duyarga Ağları, duyarga düğümleri adı verilen sınırlı bataryaya sahip 
küçük aygıtlardan oluşur. Kendi çevrelerinden veri toplamak ve bu verileri kablosuz 
iletişimle dağıtmak için kullanılırlar. Son zamanlardaki uygulama alanlarından biri 
sualtı algılamasıdır. Sualtı Kablosuz Duyarga Ağları (SKDA)’nda iletişim hava yoluyla 
iletişimden farklıdır. SKDA’lar için radyo frekansları kullanılamaz. Bunun yerine, 
SKDA’larda, ekstra zorluğa sebep olan akustik dalgalar kullanılır. SKDA’lar saldırıya 
açık bir alana dağıtıldıklarında, düğümler saldırgan tarafından ele geçirilebilir. 
SDKA’larda güvenliği sağlayabilmek için anahtar dağılım problemi çözülmelidir. 
Ayrıca, SDKA’lar denizde sürüklenebileceklerinden dolayı hareketlidirler.  
Bu tezde, (i) göçebe hareket modeli ve (ii) kıvrımlı akıntı hareket modeli; isimli 
iki grup hareket modeli için uygulanabilen bir anahtar dağılım modeli önerilmiştir.  
Göçebe hareket modeline dayalı anahtar dağılım şemamız üç boyutta çalışabilmektedir. 
Ancak, bu şema ancak küçük kıyı alanlar için uygundur. Diğer yandan, kıvrımlı akıntı 
hareket modeline dayalı anahtar dağılım şemamız iki boyutlu ve açık denizde 
kilometrelerce alana yayılabilmektedir.  Her iki şemada da hiyerarşik bir yapı 
kullanılmıştır. Güvenli ve dayanıklı grup iletişimi, yaygın olarak bilinen Blom anahtar 
dağılım şeması yardımı ile sağlandı. Önerilen şemaların performanslarını simülasyon 
kullanarak analiz ettik.  Sonuçlarımız iki şemanın da güvenli bağlanılabilirliği genellikle 
yüksek çıktığını göstermiştir.  Elbette; hareketlilik, bağlanılabilirlikte bazı geçici 
düşüşlere sebep olabilir. Ancak şemalarımızın yapısı, zaman içinde bağlanılabilirlik 
performansının iyileşmesine yardımcı olmaktadır. Dahası şemalarımız,  bazı 
düğümlerin düşman tarafından ele geçmesinin ele geçirilmemiş düğümler arasındaki 
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bağların çok az miktarının öğrenilmesine sebep olduğu güzel bir dayanıklılık 
performansı göstermektedir. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Wireless sensor networks which consist of small battery powered devices  
are applied in various applications such as military, agriculture, habitat monitoring and 
healthcare [1,24]. Another application area of wireless sensor networks is underwater 
aquatic applications which recently attract network research community [6, 35, 36, 37, 
38, 48]. These networks are used for military underwater surveillance, oceanographic 
data collection, ecology, public safety and industrial products [33].  
In underwater conditions, communication is not as easy as airborne. Radio 
frequency which is used for airborne wireless communication, is not suitable for 
underwater. For that reason acoustic frequency has to be used in communication which 
results in some challenges.[37, 46, 47] Acoustic communication has large latency, low 
bandwidth and high error-rate which have to be considered in underwater modeling [6]. 
As Underwater Wireless Sensor Network (UWSN) is a recent area, mostly main 
problems are addressed by researchers such as synchronization [40], data gathering 
 2 
 
[39], localization [41], routing protocols [42,43], energy minimization and MAC issues 
[44,45]. Despite the fact that underwater networks are in a hostile environment which 
are suitable for node capture attacks, there is not much research on security of UWSN. 
In this thesis, we work on security in UWSNs.  
Security for networks is provided by cryptographic mechanisms such as 
encryption and decryption operations. However these operations are not trivial for 
sensor networks, since sensor devices have limited memory and computational power. 
In addition, transmission in underwater networks is more energy consuming process 
because of acoustic frequencies.  
There are two types of encryption/decryption operations: Public Key 
Cryptography and Symmetric Key Cryptography. In public key cryptography, each user 
has its own private and public keys. Sender encrypts message by using receiver’s public 
key. Then receiver decrypts the message by using its own private key. This operation 
requires too much energy which is not suitable for sensor networks. In symmetric key 
both sides have the same key for encryption/decryption operations. This operation is 
more suitable for wireless sensor network since it does not consume large amount of 
energy. However, in symmetric key cryptography it is not trivial to distribute those 
secret keys.  
There are various key distribution mechanisms that are proposed for wireless 
sensor networks. One of the main mechanisms is Basic Scheme of Eschanuer and 
Gligor [16]. This scheme provides a trade-off between connectivity of sensors and 
resiliency of the network against capture attacks. There are also hierarchical types of 
key distribution mechanisms which have clusters of normal sensors and cluster heads 
that communicate with the main station [27, 28, 29].  This reduces the communication 
in the whole network. As in underwater networks transmission is costly, it is important 
to reduce the communication. Hence, hierarchical networks are more suitable for 
underwater sensor networks. There is also another type of mechanism called Blom’s 
scheme which is based on matrices [20]. This scheme has λ security, which means that 
network is resilient until λ nodes are captured. In our scheme we have also utilized from 
Blom’s scheme to increase resiliency of the network. 
In addition to security issue, mobility is another issue in underwater. There are 
several factors such as current and underwater living creatures that drift nodes. 
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Therefore underwater network models should be designed by considering mobility of 
nodes. There are some entity and group mobility models for sensor networks. One of 
the main entity models is random walk mobility model [29]. There are also other 
mobility models such as random way point mobility model, random direction mobility 
model, Gauss-Markov mobility model etc. Some of the group mobility models are 
nomadic mobility, column mobility model, pursue mobility model and reference point 
group mobility models [29].  As nodes are drifted by the affect of similar sources, nodes 
move in groups. For this reason, group mobility models are more suitable for 
underwater sensor networks. In addition, there is a mobility model called meandering 
current mobility model that is based on ocean dynamics which drifts nodes via currents. 
1.1  Our Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis 
As underwater sensor network is a recent research area, there is not enough work 
on security issues since fundamental challenges are focused initially. Especially there is 
no proposed scheme for key distribution. In this thesis, we proposed two key 
distribution models for underwater wireless sensor networks.  
In underwater network, all models must be designed by considering mobility 
issue. In this thesis, we propose two key distribution models based on two mobility 
models. In the first model, nodes move in view of nomadic mobility model. Nomadic 
Mobility Key Distribution Model is a three dimensional model for small areas. Other 
key distribution model is based on Meandering Current Mobility Model. This model is 
applicable for large areas but it is a two dimensional model. For both models, we 
perform performance analysis to measure connectivity and resiliency. Both schemes 
have nearly perfect resiliency since Blom’s scheme is utilized in groups. Adversary 
cannot compromise any additional links using the nodes he/she captured previously. 
Connectivity is also around 1.0 since it is recovered by the help of elevator model.   
 
1.2 Organization of the Thesis 
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives preliminary 
information about underwater wireless sensor networks and its challenges, network 
structure types for sensor networks, security and key distribution background. This 
chapter also includes explanation of Blom’s scheme and background information about 
mobility models. In Chapter 3, we explained about our scheme Nomadic Mobility 
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Based Key Distribution Model and show its performance. In Chapter 4, we introduced 
our model called Meandering Current Mobility Based Key Distribution Model and give 
its results. Finally Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Background Information 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Underwater Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), consist of small, inexpensive devices called 
sensor nodes [1]. Sensor nodes have limited battery, memory, data processing capacity 
and short transmission range. They can measure different types of physical properties 
such as temperature, sound, pressure etc [2]. They can track an object or monitor the 
surrounding environment to collect data [1, 3, 4, 5]. They have a wide range of 
application areas such as health-care monitoring, military applications, agriculture and 
habitat monitoring. Also recently there is a growing interest in monitoring aqueous 
environments such as rivers, oceans and lakes for scientific and commercial aims [6].  
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Since the physical properties of air and acoustic environment is different, sensing needs 
special type of network which are called underwater sensor networks. 
Due to the communication system in underwater, there are lots of challenges in 
underwater sensor network modeling. Communication system is more difficult in 
underwater conditions than airborne communication. This implies that usage of 
terrestrial WSN is not possible for UWSN [7]. Since radio frequency does not work 
well in underwater, in UWSN nodes should communicate using acoustic frequency. 
Acoustic communication has large latency, low bandwidth and high error-rate [6]. In 
addition, as there are currents in acoustic environments, nodes are dragged with water 
which adds a mobility aspect to the problem. Also, underwater environment is not 
suitable for human exploration because of high pressure, unpredictable underwater 
activities and vast size of water area [7]. Due to all those difficulties, modeling in 
underwater sensor networks requires much more effort to come up with those 
challenges. 
 
2.2 Network Structure 
 There are different types of wireless sensor networks according to their network 
structure. They can be hierarchical or distributed (flat) as it can be seen in Figure 2.1. In 
distributed network all sensor nodes communicate with the main station called sink, and 
also they can communicate with the nodes which are in their range. All nodes have 
equal power and there is no hierarchy for their communication. On the other hand, in 
hierarchical network, there are clusters of nodes where nodes from different clusters 
communicate via the heads of clusters [2, 12, 13, 14].   
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2.1 (a) Flat Network Structure (b) Hierarchical Network Structure   
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Radio frequencies do not work well in underwater sensor networks. For this 
reason, technologies like GPS, which are used to control the location of nodes, cannot 
be used in underwater. Therefore, in most localization schemes some reference nodes 
are used. These reference nodes’ places are known and they are used to determine other 
nodes’ position by calculating their distance according to the reference nodes [15]. This 
fact leads to construct the structure in a hierarchical way. In this structure, some nodes 
are special ones. These are called anchor nodes and they are used as reference points.   
In addition as it will be explained in Section 2.3, hierarchical structure is more suitable 
for key distribution in underwater sensor networks. Since acoustic frequencies, which 
consume huge amount of energy, are used in underwater networks, it is important to 
reduce the communication. In hierarchical network design communication is decreased 
which makes it suitable for underwater sensor networks. 
 
2.3 Security and Key Distribution Background  
Underwater wireless sensor networks are deployed to hostile environment in 
which it is possible to capture nodes. Since networks can be used for military 
applications, it is significant to model the network resilient to attacks. Besides, sensor 
readings should be protected securely [8]. In a wireless application an adversary not 
only can eavesdrop the traffic but also can interrupt the messages [2]. As far as 
underwater sensor networks are wireless applications, security requirements for wireless 
sensor networks are also valid for underwater sensor networks. Some security 
requirements for wireless applications are data confidentiality, integrity, freshness, 
availability, self organization, time synchronization, secure localization and 
authentication [9].  
Data confidentiality is the protection of data from unauthorized parties against 
eavesdropping. It is provided by encryption of the message with a secret key. Integrity 
is the assurance that the message received is exactly same as the message that is sent by 
the authorized party. In other words, if integrity is provided, then there is no insertion, 
deletion or modification in the message. Freshness suggests that the data is a recent 
message. That is to say it is the assurance that data is not a replay of an old message. 
Availability means that WSN can provide service whenever it is needed. Self 
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organization suggests that every node is independent and it can heal itself under several 
conditions. Most of the applications depend on a time concept which requires time 
synchronization between nodes. Secure localization is the ability to locate each nodes 
position automatically and accurately. Authentication is the assurance that the 
communicating entity is the one it claims to be.   
Cryptographic mechanisms are used to handle authentication, data 
confidentiality and integrity problems. There are two types of cryptographic 
mechanisms for encryption: asymmetric key cryptography and symmetric key 
cryptography.  
In symmetric key cryptography, there is one key which is used for both 
decryption and encryption. Sender encrypts the message using that common key and 
sends it to the other party. Then receiver decrypts message by using the same key. Main 
challenge in symmetric key is the distribution of this common key to the entities.  
In an asymmetric key cryptography (a.k.a. public-key cryptography), each entity 
has its own public and private keys. Private key is only known by the owner; whereas, 
public key is known by anyone. Sender encrypts the message by using the public key of 
the sender. Then receiver decrypts the message by using his own private key. As no 
common keys are used in asymmetric cryptography, key distribution is trivial. 
However, public key operations require more energy and computational power. Due the 
limited battery of sensor nodes, public key cryptography is not preferred for wireless 
sensor networks; thus symmetric key is used for wireless sensor networks, similarly for 
underwater wireless sensor networks [10, 11].   
Distribution of symmetric keys is not a trivial problem that many researchers 
have studied in this area and proposed lots of schemes [2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. It is 
not trivial since there is a trade-off between memory and resiliency. If only one pairwise 
key is used in whole network, it is obvious that if any of nodes is captured, adversary 
can compromise all nodes in the network, which means that network is not resilient to 
capture attacks. On the other hand, if different pairwise keys are generated for each pair, 
it is resilient to capture attacks since if a node is captured it cannot learn any 
information about other links. However, in this model each node should store     
keys, where   is the number of nodes in network. As nodes have limited memory, it is 
not possible for a node to store that much key information. Hence, it is not easy to 
handle resiliency and memory issues in key distribution.  
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First scheme about key distribution in wireless sensor network was proposed by 
Eschenauer and Gligor [16]. This scheme is also called as basic scheme and is based on 
random key pre-distribution. Each node is preloaded with keys from a key pool 
randomly before they are deployed. This phase is called key-predistribution phase. 
Then, the nodes are randomly deployed to the area, where each node starts the process 
to learn its neighbors. As the nodes have random keys, they may share common keys 
with its neighbors. Two nodes can communicate if they have common keys; otherwise, 
they cannot communicate directly. Looking for a common key process is called shared 
key discovery phase. If two neighbors do not have common keys, then they try to find a 
path to communicate via other direct links. This phase is also called path-key 
establishment phase. If the number of keys loaded to nodes is increased it is obvious 
that the probability of finding common keys will increase which means that 
connectivity of the entire network will also increase. However the main problem of this 
scheme is that when number of keys in memories of nodes increases, resiliency to 
attacks decreases. If a node is captured, adversary can easily reach other nodes’ keys, 
which means that there is a security problem. Hence in basic scheme, if network is more 
connected then it is less secure. 
Several other schemes are inspired from the basic scheme [17, 24, 25, 26]. Most 
of those schemes work in distributed fashion in which any two sensor nodes can 
establish pairwise keys. Due the fact that wireless sensor networks have large amount of 
nodes and high density, distributed structure leads to consume high amount of energy 
for key distribution. Moreover, their communication overhead is significant. In that 
sense, this is more serious for underwater sensor networks since acoustic waves, which 
consume more energy than radio frequencies, are used for underwater communication. 
Thus, hierarchical structures are more favorable than distributed ones for underwater 
wireless sensor networks. In that sense, we have also employed a hierarchical structure 
for our key distribution models. 
As nodes have short transmission range, only neighboring nodes need to secure 
their communication; they do not need share common keys with far away nodes. Based 
on this idea, in hierarchical structure nodes in the same cluster communicate with each 
other. If a node needs to communicate with a node from another cluster, they can 
communicate via their cluster heads.  
Jolly et al. proposed a scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks [28]. In 
this scheme, network is made up of clusters where each cluster has a gateway node 
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(cluster head) and several normal sensor nodes. Each node communicates only with its 
gateway node, and gateways can talk to each other and the sink. Each gateway node is 
loaded with several keys for normal nodes before deployment and each sensor is loaded 
with a gateway’s ID and a key shared with this gateway. After deployment if sensor 
node’s cluster head has the same ID with gateway ID in sensor node’s memory, then 
this cluster head and sensor node establish a secure link. Otherwise, cluster head 
requests the desired key from corresponding gateway. Then, cluster head and sensor 
node can communicate securely. In this scheme, network performance is increased since 
hierarchical network is used. However, in this scheme resiliency problem is not 
addressed. If any gateway node is captured, all nodes’ links which take their keys from 
this gateway are compromised. Also in this model, to increase the performance they use 
a group key for gateway’s communication, which reduces security significantly. If a 
gateway node is captured, adversary can compromise all the communications among 
other gateways. Therefore, it is obvious that if a gateway node is captured, all network 
is crashed.    
In our scheme, we used hierarchical network to increase network performance. 
However we used some techniques to handle the resiliency problem. The technique that 
we used in our scheme to increase security is Blom’s scheme which is explained in 
details below.  
 
 
2.4 Blom’s Scheme 
In random pool based schemes, there is not a guarantee that two neighbors share 
a common key which means that they need to communicate via other secure links that 
increases the communication overhead. Also this affects security of the network 
negatively. Blom proposed an approach which guarantees that any two nodes in a group 
can generate a common key [20]. This is a matrix-based solution. Also, it has  -secure 
property where   is a threshold. Network is secure until   nodes are captured. If more 
than   nodes are captured, all keys in the group are revealed. 
In this scheme, initially public and private matrices are generated by a key 
distribution center. Let   be the public matrix such that any       columns are 
linearly independent. It has the size of          , where   is number of nodes in a 
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group and   is an expected threshold.  A well-known example of such matrix is a Van 
Der Monde matrix. It is in the following format: 
  
When   is a primitive element of a prime     , the values s, s2, s3,…, sN are all 
distinct which makes all columns of   linearly independent.  
In Blom’s scheme, there is also a private   matrix of size                                
             which is known to the key distribution center only. The transpose of 
    is denoted by  . That is       . The rows of   are private information own to 
each node.       is the symmetric matrix which includes the pairwise keys. Each 
element             is the key shared between node    and node   . 
Each node is loaded with a row of   such that node   is loaded with      row of  
  . There is no need to load public matrix to nodes memory, since it can be calculated if 
the seed   and   are known. For this reason, each node is only loaded with   and  . If 
node   wants to communicate with node  ,  then node  , calculates the     raw of matrix 
  and multiplies it with its own private information which is    row of   . As a result it 
finds      which is element at   
    row and      column of . Similarly, node  , calculates 
the     raw of matrix   and multiplies it     row of    and finds      which is element at 
    row and     column of . Since    is a symmetric matrix,        . All these 
matrices are depicted in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2 Blom’s scheme  
 
By combining Blom’s scheme and basic scheme, Du et al. proposed an approach 
called Multiple Space Key Pre-distribution scheme [21]. In this model, there are 
multiple key spaces in the key pool. Nodes are pre-loaded with h different key spaces 
randomly. Then they are deployed to the environment. If two nodes have a common key 
material from same key space, then they can generate a Blom key, otherwise they try to 
generate a path-key via secure links. This scheme increases resiliency of Blom’s 
scheme, however due to path-key establishment phase, communication and 
computational overhead increase. Also, nodes have to store more key spaces, which 
increase memory overhead. In underwater network, communication overhead is a 
significant issue. Thus, Multiple Space Key Pre-distribution scheme is not suitable for 
our scheme. We preferred to employ Blom’s scheme for in our key distribution scheme. 
 
 
2.5 Mobility Models 
In underwater networks there are external factors such as current, wind and 
underwater creatures which drift nodes in the water. For that reason underwater 
networks should be modeled by considering their mobility. There are lots of mobility 
models for wireless sensor networks some of which are explained below.  
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Mobility models can be classified as entity mobility models and group mobility 
models. One of the main entity mobility models is Random Walk Mobility Model [29]. 
In this model each node moves with random speed to random direction. Nodes direction 
can be between [0,2п] and its speed can be between [minspeed, maxspeed] range where 
minspeed is the minimum speed and maxspeed is the maximum speed that each node 
can have. Each node travels a distance  with randomly chosen speed in constant time  . 
After a node reaches to the destination, it chooses another direction and speed 
randomly. When it reaches to a boundary of the area, it bounces off the border with an 
angle which is determined by the incoming direction. Many versions of Random Walk 
Mobility models exist such as 1-D, 2-D, 3-D and d-D walks. Since it does not use any 
past information about speed and direction, this model is known as memoryless model. 
Figure 2.3 shows the traveling pattern of a single node using Random Walk Mobility 
Model. There are also several entity models such as random way point mobility model, 
random direction mobility model, Gauss-Markov mobility model [29]. 
 
Figure 2.3 Traveling pattern of a single node using random walk mobility model [29] 
There are also group mobility models which examine not only one node’s 
mobility behavior but also all nodes mobility in network. Nomadic mobility is one of 
the well-known group based mobility models [29]. In this model, nodes act like an 
ancient nomadic community. Group moves from one reference point to another 
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collectively and individuals move randomly around this reference point. As all nodes 
move together to new reference point, they roam around the new reference point as 
shown in Figure 2.4.  There are also several group mobility models such as column 
mobility model, pursue mobility model, reference point group mobility model etc. 
 
        Figure 2.4 Movements of seven nodes using nomadic community model [29] 
 
Each sensor moves independently from others in most of the mobility models for 
mobile sensor networks in the literature [30-32]. However in underwater network, nodes 
move with the effect of stream which means that it is important to propose a model 
which takes into account the dynamics of the water [33]. Nodes will be affected from 
similar forces which results in nodes’ group mobility. To consider this issue, in our 
model we use nomadic community mobility model which is designed as nodes are 
drifted with a current in groups. 
   Caruso et al. proposed a mobility model for underwater sensor networks called 
Meandering Current Mobility model [33]. In this model, nodes are moving by the affect 
of meandering sub-surface currents and vortices. This model is for large ocean 
environments that span several kilometers. They consider that paths of nodes are 
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deterministic and there is a strong correlation between nearby sensors. In order to 
simulate nodes mobility, it is important to model the movement of ocean in which they 
are immersed. Vertical movements in ocean are negligible with respect to horizontal 
ones [34]. Thus, in their model they neglect vertical displacement which makes mobility 
in 2D. The details of the model are explained in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Time evolution of the position of one hundred sensors randomly 
released in a square of 4 km of side [33]. 
 
Movement of the nodes in 3 days is depicted in Figure 2.5. This model is more 
realistic than other group mobility models for WSNs since nodes are drifted according 
to the movement of the ocean. In this thesis, we also propose a security model which is 
based on Meandering Current Mobility Model. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
A Key Distribution Scheme for Underwater Sensor Networks with 
Nomadic Mobility Model 
 
 
 
3.1 Network Architecture of Nomadic Mobility Based Model  
In this work, our goal is to develop a key distribution model, which is applicable 
for underwater sensor networks. This model is designed as three dimensional model and 
it is a coastal model; in other words it is not for large areas like oceans. It is assumed 
that nodes do not go away from the designated area. 
 Key distribution in underwater sensor network is a challenging problem, since 
underwater communication is airborne communication. As mentioned in Section 2.2 
and Section 2.3, hierarchical network, which reduces the communication cost of nodes, 
is more suitable for underwater sensor networks. Communication cost is tried to be 
lessened in underwater sensor networks because of the cost of acoustic frequencies. 
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Therefore, hierarchical network structure which decreases communication cost is more 
applicable for underwater sensor networks.  
One of the hierarchical underwater sensor network schemes is proposed by Zhou 
et al [49]. The aim of this is scheme is to solve localization problem for underwater 
sensor network. This system consists of three types of nodes: surface buoys, anchor 
nodes and ordinary sensor nodes. Each surface buoy is equipped with GPSs. In this 
system, all the anchor nodes can estimate their positions by contacting directly with 
surface buoys. Ordinary nodes localization is also determined through anchor nodes. In 
another scheme [50], Dive and Rise (DNR) positioning is proposed. In this scheme, 
each DNR beacons are equipped with GPSs. Beacons are moving in y coordinate. When 
beacons come to the surface, they learn their places by the help of GPS. When they dive 
into the water, they broadcast their position information to help ordinary nodes to 
calculate their positions. There is also another scheme [51] which consists of four types 
of nodes that are surface buoys, DETs (Detachable Elevator Transceivers), anchor 
nodes and ordinary nodes. In this scheme, surface buoys are equipped with GPSs. DET 
is attached to a surface buoy and it can rise and down to broadcast its position. This 
scheme increases the localization accuracy and decreases the cost of the system. 
Those schemes deal with localization problem; however, in our scheme we deal 
with key distribution problem. Nevertheless, we are inspired from architecture of the 
network architecture of the above systems. They use surface buoys for GPS 
communication; whereas we used them for reducing underwater communication. When 
it is needed, some heavy communications is handled airborne instead of underwater. In 
our scheme, similar to [51], there are surface buoys and elevators. Elevators are moving 
in y coordinate and they are attached to surface buoys with a cable, which provides 
them a communication capability. There are also ordinary nodes in groups who are 
communicating with their own elevators.  Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of the 
scheme.  
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Figure 3.1 Network structure of nomadic mobility based model 
In Figure 3.1 there are three types of nodes.  Surface buoys are communicating 
among themselves airborne. Each surface buoy is attached to an elevator which moves 
up and down in the sea. Each group of node can only communicate with its own 
elevator. Also each group of nodes can communicate within its group. Thus, it is 
obvious that there is a hierarchy as can be seen in Figure 3.2. In this figure, there is an 
example of a hierarchy which has 3 surface buoys and 3 elevators. Each elevator has 3 
groups and each group has 15 nodes. 
  
   
 20 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Hierarchy of 3 Elevators, 3 Surface Buoys, 9 groups and 135 nodes. 
 
3.2 Communication Patterns in Nomadic Mobility Based Model 
In our scheme there are five types of communication patterns. They are: (i) 
elevator to elevator, (ii) elevator to node, (iii) node to node in same group, (iv) node to 
node in different groups that belong to same elevator and (v) node to node in different 
groups that belong to different elevators. 
Before giving information about elevator communication, it is important to state 
the assumptions about elevator and surface buoy relationship in this work. It is assumed 
that surface buoys are communicating with elevators through a cable and surface buoys 
have large memory and computational power. In addition it is assumed that they cannot 
be captured by the adversary. According to these assumptions as surface buoys have 
large memory, elevator to elevator communication is handled with surface buoys 
through the air with a pairwise key. Each elevator pair will have different keys, which 
enhances security. Also, as it is explained above, it is important to reduce the 
communication overhead for underwater sensor networks. Airborne communication 
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among surface buoys would increase the performance of the model since airborne 
communication is less costly.  
Also, each node can communicate with elevator by using a pairwise key. Since 
elevator’s memory and computation is assumed to be large, it is not a burden for an 
elevator to have different keys for each node in its memory. Then each node is loaded 
with a pairwise key for communication with its elevator. 
In addition, reducing communication overhead policy is applied for node to node 
communication within the same group as well. Blom’s scheme is utilized in our scheme, 
as it is one of the best schemes that has low communication cost [53]. In the hierarchical 
architecture explained in Section 3.1, the nodes are grouped. Moreover, each group has 
its own Blom’s key space. Thus, if there are   groups for each elevator, then each 
elevator is loaded with    key spaces.  
Symbolically, in Blom’s scheme key space is a symmetric matrix,     , 
where G is public matrix and A is private matrix. If   groups are connected to Elevator 
 , ELt , then ELt is loaded with {A0,G0, A2,G2,…, Ap-1,Gp-1}. If node h belongs to Group f, 
then it will be loaded with   th raw of the private matrix Af. In other words, only nodes 
in the same group can communicate to each other, as they cannot calculate a common 
key if they belong to different groups.  
Node to node communication in different groups, but in the same elevator is 
handled via the elevator. If a node from a group wants to communicate with a node 
from another group that belongs to same elevator, it needs to send a request to its 
elevator. As elevator can also communicate with the requested node, elevator 
determines a random pairwise key for those nodes’ communication, and sends this key 
to both of nodes in a secure way. Then the communication between those nodes 
continues with this key. This protocol is explained symbolically in Figure 3.3. na tries to 
communicate with nb. Those nodes belong to the same elevator called ELA. na firstly 
sends its request to  ELA which generates a pairwise key for na and nb. Then, ELA sends 
the generated key to both parties. Then they secure messages by encrypting/decrypting 
with this key.  
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Figure 3.3 Protocol for node to node communication in different groups, but in the same 
elevator 
Node to node communication in different groups and different elevators is 
established by the communication of the elevators. If a node from a group wants to 
communicate with a node from another group that belongs to a different elevator, then it 
sends a request to its own elevator. This elevator communicates with corresponding 
elevator which has the requested node. Then these elevators agree on a key for the 
communication of those nodes. Then, they send this key to their corresponding nodes in 
a secure way. For future communications those nodes use this established key. This 
protocol is explained symbolically in Figure 3.4. Also all these communication types 
are summarized in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.4 Protocol for node to node communication in different groups and different 
elevators  
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Figure 3.5 Communication patterns in our hierarchical architecture and 
corresponding key establishment mechanisms 
 
3.3 Nomadic Mobility Model 
Nodes in underwater cannot be static because of the external effects. In 
underwater there are several factors such as current and living creatures that drift nodes. 
For this reason, the scheme should consider the mobility of the nodes. The most 
powerful expected effect is the wave. As we assume that our scheme is suitable for sea 
shore not for deep sea, nodes will be affected from the same force of wave. It means 
that mobility of all nodes have the same direction. Then there is group mobility. In 
addition each node can also be affected from small other factors like fishes.  
The most similar model with these properties is nomadic community model. As 
it is explained in Section 2.5, nodes are drifted together to a place and then in this new 
place, each node makes small movements independently in a random way. In our 
scheme, there are groups and those groups move with a stream to a direction and each 
node moves slightly from its new place.  
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Figure 3.6 Nomadic mobility of nodes 
 
The left figure in Figure 3.4, shows the initial position of nodes. Nodes are 
affected by the stream that is shown as red arrows. All nodes move in the direction of 
that arrow for a time period. After that, they reach to a new place, and then each node 
changes its place slightly. After a while this movement results in mixture of different 
groups of nodes. Also some nodes fall behind and break away from its group. Here, our 
scheme fixes this disengagement of nodes. Elevators have vital mission to prevent break 
of nodes from other nodes. While the elevators are diving and rising, they sense the 
groups of nodes in its range. If the number of nodes that belong to a group is very low, 
then it means that these nodes have been broken away from its group. Then these nodes 
should be included to the nearest group. This is handled by elevators. That entire 
scenario is explained in detail in the following section. 
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3.4 Key Establishment Phases 
Key establishment can be examined in three phases: before deployment, after 
deployment and after movement phases. These phases are explained in details in 
following subsections. Also Table 1 contains the symbols that are used in this section. 
    Node with ID   
    Surface buoy with ID    
    Elevator with ID    
      Surface buoy & elevator with ID   
    Group with ID   
   Private matrix   of group      
   Public matrix   of group      
  Total number of surface buoy & 
elevator units 
  Total number of groups 
  Total number of nodes 
  Number of nodes per surface buoy 
& elevator units 
  Number of nodes per group 
    Key between entity    and   where 
both can be a surface buoy and 
elevator unit or a node 
            Encryption of a message    with 
a key   
   Redundant parameter 
   Set of waiting groups to be added 
to the nearest group  
    Clustering determination ratio 
       Request Message 
 
Table 1 Symbols used in this section 
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3.4.1 Before Deployment 
Initially, all surface buoys are loaded with pairwise keys for secure 
communication between other surface buoys. As there is a cable which provides instant 
communication between a surface buoy and its corresponding elevator, we can see the 
surface buoy and the elevator as the same operational unit. For this reason, we use 
surface buoy & elevator combined unit for the following operations. Each surface buoy 
& elevator unit is loaded with pairwise keys that provide secure communication 
between the elevator and its nodes. Each surface buoy & elevator unit calculates Blom’s 
matrices for each group of node which belongs to this elevator. Public and private 
matrices (A and G matrices) of each group are loaded to the memory of owing surface 
buoy & elevator unit.  
Symbolically surface buoy     and elevator       are combined as the same 
operational surface buoy & elevator unit as       . Each       where       and 
  is the total number of surface buoy & elevator units, is loaded with    and    
matrices of each group     where       and    is the number of groups that belong 
to a     .     
Each node is firstly loaded with a unique ID. Then it is loaded with a pairwise 
key for secure communication with its elevator. Also it is loaded with private 
parameters which is a row of its group’s Blom Private Matrix ( ). Suppose that node 
    belongs to a group     which belongs to a surface buoy & elevator       . Then 
this node will be loaded with ID  , ID   and a row of private matrix     . 
Suppose that   is the number of     s and   is the number of groups per 
    . Also each group contains   number of ordinary nodes. Then each        , 
      have     number of different pairwise keys to communicate with each 
surface buoy & elevator unit. Each         also has     number of pairwise keys, for 
node communications. Also each of        has   number of public   and private   
matrices.  The size of public matrix is      and private matrix is     where   is security 
threshold. If we want our scheme to be resilient to attacks, then this parameter should be 
large. Also, according to our scheme, some nodes will be added to the groups during the 
operation. Then node per group changes in time. In order to compensate this change, we 
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need to have some redundant private and public rows and columns. When a new node is 
added to the group, a row of private matrix is loaded to this new node. Number of these 
redundant rows is a parameter which is   . Then public matrix is            of size 
and private matrix is            of size. Also each node     which belongs to     
and       , have just one pairwise key,     , for communication with         and a 
row of the private key of   which has   number of elements.  
 
3.4.2 After Deployment 
In our model we use Blom’s scheme. We assume that nodes that belong to the 
same group are deployed together. Also groups belong to an elevator are deployed near 
to its elevator. Elevator is also diving and rising continually. We assume that nodes are 
deployed according to Gaussian distribution. After deployment each node tries to find 
its neighbors by broadcasting its ID. Suppose     which belongs to    in       tries to 
find its neighbors. If its neighbor     belongs to the same group   , then     calculates 
their common key     by multiplying its private parameters which is row of    and the 
column of public matrix   . Similarly,     calculates their common key    
where           . After that, they talk securely with this calculated common key. If the 
neighbor node     belongs to another group     which belongs to same surface buoy & 
elevator unit       , then they should establish a key via       .         determines a 
random pairwise key     for those nodes and it sends this key to     and     by using 
keys     and     in a secure way. After that these nodes use this key for their 
communication.  If the neighbor node     belongs  to another group   which is owned 
by a different surface buoy and elevator unit       , then these nodes can provide their 
key with the help of        and       .         and        agree on a key 
    which is used for those nodes communication. This process is provided by the 
communication of surface buoys airborne. This established key     is sent by        
and         to     and    . All these operations are explained in pseudo code at Figure 
3.7. 
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Figure 3.7 Pseudo code of after deployment phase 
 
3.4.3 Operational Phase:  
After key establishment phase is completed, communication between nodes 
starts. Nodes are drifted because of waves in the sea. We modeled this mobility model 
according to nomadic group mobility model [29]. In this model, nodes go with a 
random speed and direction for a while. Then each node move slightly with random 
speed to a random direction. While nodes are moving, their neighbors are changing. For 
this reason, elevators connect new neighbors and fix up the groups. While elevator is 
rising and diving, it constantly sense around to understand how many groups and nodes 
are in its range. It tries to sense if any node is drifted away from its group. Elevator 
realizes this by determining a clustering determination ratio. If the number of nodes that 
belong to a group is smaller than this ratio, it means that these nodes have been drifted 
away from its own group and should be included to a nearer group. For this aim, the 
nearest group whose number of nodes in elevator’s range is larger than clustering 
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determination ratio, is found. Then the nodes which are drifted away from its group are 
added to that group. Four different cases may occur here: 
Suppose that       realizes   groups in its range.   of   groups have more 
number of nodes than the clustering determination ratio    . Then nodes in 
    groups in range of       are waiting to be added to another group. This 
set of groups who are waiting to be added to another group is expressed as  . 
Also,     is a node from     which belongs to       and it is in range of 
     . The nearest group that this node is planned to be added is     which 
belongs to        and it is in the range of          
 If additive node     and the group that it will be added       , belong to 
the sensing surface buoy & elevator unit       , then       sends a 
new private parameter raw from    which is the new group’s private 
matrix (one of the redundant rows of    matrix from this      ’s Blom 
key space) and new group ID to additive node    .  
 If additive node     belongs to the sensing surface buoy & elevator 
unit       but the group     does not belong to       , then 
      communicates with    ’s surface buoy & elevator unit        
and gets a row of private matrix     airborne. Then       sends this row 
and new group ID to additive node    . 
  If group       belongs to the sensing surface buoy & elevator unit       
but node     does not belong to      , then        communicates with 
the owing surface buoy & elevator unit       airborne and gets a secure 
communication key       to communicate with this node and sends a row 
from    and new group ID to additive node    . 
 If both the node     and the group     does not belong to the sensing 
surface buoy & elevator         , then         firstly communicates with 
the owing surface buoy & elevator unit        of the group     airborne 
and gets a row from    for a new node. Then surface buoy & elevator 
unit       communicates with       which is   the owing surface buoy 
& elevator unit of the additive node    .        gets a secure 
communication key     to communicate with this node and sends the row 
from    and new group ID to additive node    .  
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All of these operations are explained in Figure 3.8. After all these operations, 
node     erases its old private parameters and establishes new links with its new 
neighbors. This operation prevents breakaways and provides all nodes be connected to 
the network. Also, as most of the communications are handled airborne, it does not lead 
to much communication overhead.  
 
end
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Figure 3.8 Pseudo code of operational phase 
 
3.5 Implementation Details  
 Simulation of this model is implemented on Visual Studio 2010 environment 
and used C# for coding. In our simulation there are 960 nodes that are deployed as two 
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layers by using Gaussian distribution model. There are 32 groups that each group has 30 
nodes. Simulation area is               . There are four elevators and four 
surface buoys. Sensor range is 50 meters [53] and each sensor’s speed is maximum 3.6 
m/min. Elevator’s speed is constant with amount of 5 m/min. Packet energy 
consumption values are calculated in [54]. They have measured average packet delay 
and average energy consumption per packet for different type of MAC layers. We chose 
RMAC model as it is much more energy efficient than the others. RMAC’s average 
energy consumption per packet is 70 milijoule. Besides, there is also energy 
consumption for encryption and decryption operations. AES encryption/decryption is 
used for symmetric key cryptography. Underwater network’s nodes are built around a 
CPU unit based on ATmega128 microcontroller [55] and it consumes 1.62 µjoule/byte 
for encryption and 2.49 µjoule/byte for decryption [56]. According to those values we 
have performed our simulation and get the following results. 
 
3.6 Performance Evaluation 
We perform simulations of our proposed scheme to evaluate the results 
according to the metrics. Those metrics are secure connectivity, resiliency against node 
capture attacks and battery consumption. Secure connectivity is the probability of 
sharing common key between any two neighbor nodes. Also, resiliency is analyzed in 
two metrics called additionally compromised links ratio and total compromised links 
ratio. Battery consumption is the energy cost of key distribution operations for each 
node. Those metrics are explained in details in following subsections. Also performance 
results are illustrated in graphs in following subsections. 
 
3.6.1 Secure Connectivity  
Secure connectivity is an important metric to show the quality of key distribution 
schemes. It is the probability of any two neighboring nodes sharing a common key. 
Figure 3.9 shows the secure connectivity of our scheme based on nomadic mobility 
model.  
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Figure 3.9 Secure connectivity for nomadic mobility based model 
 
Nodes are mobile and nodes in the same group shares key in this scheme. 
Because of this mobility, some of the nodes are drifted away and for a while these nodes 
are surrounded with nodes which do not belong to the same group. Then they will not 
be connected to the graph which results in decreasing the connectivity. However as our 
model includes elevators which connect those drifted nodes to nearing groups, 
connectivity refreshes itself and become 1.0. This model results in zigzags in secure 
connectivity graph and this model heals itself in terms of connectivity when it falls.  
 
3.6.2 Resiliency against Node Capture Attacks  
 
An attacker can capture nodes in an underwater network. As nodes generally are 
not tamper proof, attacker can reach the keys of the nodes. After attacker learns the keys 
of the captured node, he can use this node as an agent to learn about the 
communications by putting the captured node the network again. It can decrypt 
messages that are sent to or sent by this captured node. In addition, if any of the keys of 
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this captured node is used between non-captured nodes, then attacker captures the link 
between these non-captured nodes.  Additionally compromised link ratio (additionally 
compromised links / all links) is a measure that shows how many extra links are reached 
by the attacker after some are captured. In other words, communication links of the 
captured nodes are not included.  In contrast, total compromised link ratio (total 
compromised links / all links) includes all links that are captured by the attacker. In a 
sense, total compromised link consists of not only all the links of captured nodes but 
also extra links that uses a captured key between non-captured nodes.  
In our scheme, Blom’s scheme which has λ-security, is used. In Blom’s scheme 
λ is the threshold. When the number of captured nodes exceeds λ, then all keys in the 
group are revealed. Thus, similarly in our scheme resiliency ratios depend on the value 
of λ. If λ is larger, the memory size needed for the matrices became larger and since 
matrices became larger, operations on matrices became larger which results in more 
energy consumption. In our scheme, group size became larger after a while as drifted 
nodes are added to nearest group. For that reason, if λ is determined as total of the initial 
node number per group and redundant parameter which is for prospective additive 
nodes, then this scheme has perfect resiliency since captured nodes cannot exceed λ in 
any time. In other words, attacker cannot reach any additional link with the help of 
captured nodes. However, if λ is larger, nodes consume too much memory and energy 
for computations. For that reason λ is determined as 10. Number of nodes per group at 
initial deployment is 30. Also the power of the attacker is determined as 2, 3 and 4 node 
captures per each minute. Resiliency graphs are illustrated in Figure 3.8 and 3.9.  
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Figure 3.10 Additionally compromised links ratio for nomadic mobility based model 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Total Compromised links ratio for nomadic mobility based model 
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 As it can be seen from Figure 3.12, at the beginning of the simulation, for a long 
time there is perfect resiliency since number of captured nodes from each group does 
not exceed λ. It means that no additional link can be reached by the attacker. However 
after a while, in some groups number of captured nodes exceeds λ security parameter 
which means that those group’s links are all revealed. Despite some groups are 
revealed, additional compromise link ratio is still in reasonable amounts, since there is 
only small number of groups in which captured number of nodes exceeds λ. When node 
captures per minute increases, additionally compromised links ratio increases as it is 
expected. For the capture rate of 4 nodes per minute we have largest additional link 
ratio. Even for this one ratio does not exceed 0.1 which is about perfect resiliency. In 
Figure 3.11 total compromised links ratio for nomadic mobility is illustrated. At the end 
of the simulation 200, 300 and 400 of 600 nodes are captured respectively for capture 
rates of 2, 3 and 4. At the end of the simulation total compromise ratio is 0.4, 0.6 and 
0.75 for capture rates 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Also, in this graph it is obvious that total 
compromised links increases when capture rate increases.  
 
3.6.3 Average Energy Consumption 
 
 Energy consumption is a significant issue since wireless sensor nodes are 
primitive equipments that have small battery power. In our simulation, we measure 
average battery consumption per node. Communication between nodes and elevator is 
calculated. Packets are encrypted and decrypted via AES which has 1.62 µjoule/byte 
energy consumption for encryption and 2.49 µjoule/byte energy consumption for 
decryption. Also each packet (64 bytes) transmission consumes 70 milijoules. 
According to those values, Figure 3.10 shows the average energy consumption per 
node. Each fix up operation of our scheme, causes energy consumption. Since the 
system makes fix up operation periodically, there is a linear increase in the graph.  
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Figure 3.12 Average energy consumption per node for nomadic mobility based model 
 
3.6.4 Memory Requirements 
 
Blom’s scheme is utilized in our model. For this reason memory needs depend 
on Blom’s scheme’s requirements. This scheme’s details are explained Section 2.4. 
Initially, each node is loaded with its own ID and the ID of the elevator that it belongs 
to. In addition, each node is loaded with private shares which are elements of a row of a 
private matrix  . This row has     elements, where   is the security threshold.  Also 
each node needs to store two parameters   and  , where   is the seed of the 
Vandermonde matrix and   is the prime number. These parameters are used to generate 
a column of a Vandermonde matrix.  
To sum up, memory requirements are ID of the node, ID of the elevator, a row 
of private matrix,   and   . The length of each of these values is the symmetric key 
length. Thus we assume that 128-bit symmetric keys are to be generated, then total 
memory requirement becomes             bits. In our simulations,     , our 
memory requirement per node is 240 bytes. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
A Key Distribution Scheme for Underwater Sensor Networks with 
Meandering Current Mobility Model 
 
 
4.1 Network Architecture of Meandering Mobility Based Model 
 This scheme is proposed as a large-scale oceanographic model. In contrast to 
nomadic mobility based model, meandering mobility based model is designed as 
boundless and it is for large ocean environments that spans several kilometers in much 
longer time. Also as meandering mobility model does not consider vertical movements, 
this scheme is designed as two dimensional model.  
Hierarchical structure is used as similar to our nomadic mobility model; 
however, since the model is two dimensional, we do not use elevator that moves 
towards the vertical axis. This time, surface buoys are connected to underwater devices 
which are fixed to the ground of the ocean.  Also surface buoys are communicating 
through the air and each surface buoy communicates with its underwater device via a 
cable. Ordinary nodes are grouped and each group can only communicate with its own 
underwater device. Then each underwater device have several number of groups.  
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of the scheme. 
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Figure 4.1 Network structure of meandering mobility based model 
 
4.2 Communication Patterns in Meandering Mobility Based Model 
Network structure of the scheme based on meandering mobility has similar 
components with the model based on nomadic mobility, communication patterns are 
also similar. The patterns are as follows: (i) underwater device to underwater device, (ii) 
underwater device to node, (iii) node to node in same group, (iv) node to node in 
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different groups that belong to same underwater device and (v) node to node in different 
groups that belong to different underwater devices. 
Underwater device to underwater device communication is handled with surface 
buoys through the air with a pairwise key. Also, underwater device to node 
communication is constructed by the help of a pairwise key. As Blom’s scheme is used, 
node to node communication in same group is established via Blom’s key. Node to node 
communication in different groups that belong to same underwater device is handled by 
the help of their underwater device. This underwater device communicates with both of 
the nodes and determines a key for their communication. Node to node communication 
in different groups that belong to different underwater devices is established via the 
communication of their underwater devices. These underwater devices agree on a key 
and sent this key to the nodes. Then this key is used for these nodes’ communication.  
 
4.3 Details of Meandering Mobility Model 
 
Nomadic mobility model is kind of an hypothetical model despite the fact that it 
seems reasonable. Meandering mobility model is more realistic since it captures the 
dynamics of the water. The meandering current mobility model [33] is a model which 
considers the movements of ocean. In this work, we proposed a key distribution model 
based on meandering current mobility model, in order to make our model more realistic. 
The proposed scheme is similar to the one proposed for nomadic mobility model, but 
the most important difference is meandering mobility model captures dynamics of the 
ocean. In this model nodes are spanning several kilometers in longer time. However this 
model is two dimensional since ocean’s vertical movements are negligible with respect 
to horizontal ones.  
In meandering mobility model two dimensional flow is described by a stream 
function Ψ. By the help of this function, displacement of nodes in x and y coordinate 
can be found. This stream function in [33] is given as follows where the symbols are 
given in Table 2: 
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 ] where                   
 
  Number of meanders in unit length 
  Phase speed with which they shift downstream 
  Width of the meanders 
  Average meander width 
  Amplitude of the modulation 
  Frequency 
Table 2 Stream Function’s variables 
 
This stream function describes a current, due to meandering between 
recirculating vortices.  In our simulations these variables are same as in [33]:      , 
      ,         ,       and       . One dimensional unit of space is a 
kilometer whereas unit of time is 0,03 days. Each sensor’s displacement in x and y 
coordinate is found as: 
                                         
                                      
 
According to these equations we have simulated the mobility model for 3 days 
(time = 100*0.03 days) for 6000 nodes deployed in 0.5 km x 1 km. Screenshots for each 
10 time unit is shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Time = 20 unit 
 
 
Time = 30 unit 
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Time = 40 unit 
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Time = 60 unit 
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Time = 80 unit 
 
Time = 90 unit 
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Time = 100 unit 
 
Figure 4.2 Positions of 6000 nodes that are randomly deployed in 0.5 km x 1 km 
area and moved in 3 days with meandering current mobility model. 
 
As it can be seen from Figure 4.2, nodes are spanning kilometers in time which 
means that nodes are drifted away from its groups that should be considered by our key 
distribution scheme. This will be explained in the following section. 
 
4.4 Key Establishment Phases 
Key establishment can be examined in three phases: before deployment, after 
deployment and operational phases. First two phases are same as the nomadic mobility 
based model whereas the last phase is slightly different in meandering mobility based 
model. 
 Before Deployment phase is same as the nomadic mobility based model. Each 
surface buoy & underwater device unit is loaded with pairwise keys for the 
communications among surface buoys. Also each surface buoy & underwater device 
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unit is loaded with its groups’ Blom key space.  Public and private matrices (A and G 
matrices) of each group are loaded to the memory of owing surface buoy & underwater 
device unit. Each node is loaded with ID, a pairwise key for secure communication with 
its underwater device and a raw of its group’s Blom Private Matrix (A).  More details 
are explained in Section 3.4.1. 
After deployment phase is also similar to the nomadic mobility based model. 
However underwater device is not rising or diving in meandering mobility based model. 
It is stable as model is two dimensional. Groups belong to same underwater device are 
deployed together. Also groups are deployed near to its owing underwater devices. 
After deployment each node finds its neighbors and tries to communicate with them 
securely. If they belong to same group, they communicate with Blom’s key. If neighbor 
node belongs to another group which is owned by the same underwater device, then 
they establish a key with the help of their underwater device. If neighbor node belongs 
to another group which is owned by a different underwater device, they establish a link 
via their underwater devices. These are explained in detail in Section 3.4.2. 
After key establishment phase is completed, nodes start to move according to 
meandering current mobility model. Underwater devices periodically sense their range 
to determine which nodes are drifted away and which nodes are include into range. If a 
node is broken away from its group then underwater device provides this node to be 
added to the nearest group. This operation’s details are explained in 3.4.3. The 
difference in phases of meandering current mobility model with respect to phases of 
nomadic mobility model is occurred in changing the places of surface buoys during the 
simulation. As meandering current mobility model spans kilometers and the area is not 
limited, all the area need to be sensed during the simulation. However it is not possible 
to cover entire area with surface buoys and underwater devices due to its cost. As nodes 
are drifted away after a while, some surface buoys will not have any groups around 
themselves whereas some additional surface buoys are needed for new places of drifted 
nodes. For this reason, the redundant surface buoys are transported to new places where 
nodes are drifted and new surface buoys are needed.  
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4.5 Implementation Details  
 This model’s simulation is implemented on Visual Studio 2010 environment and 
used C# for coding. In this simulation there are 200 groups where each group has 30 
nodes. 6000 nodes are initially deployed in 0.5 km x 1 km area and simulation area is 
not restricted.  There are 50 surface buoys and underwater devices which are moved 
during the simulation. Sensor range is 0.05 km [53]. Also similar to the simulation of 
nomadic mobility model, average energy consumption per packet is 70 milijoule [54] 
and energy consumption for encryption and decryption operations are 1.62 µjoule/byte 
and 2.49 µjoule/byte respectively [56]. According those values we performed our 
simulations for meandering mobility based model. 
 
4.6 Performance Evaluation  
Simulations are performed to get results for the metrics such as secure 
connectivity, resiliency and energy consumption. Time unit is determined as 0,03 day as 
it was performed in meandering mobility stream function. Total simulation time is 
         3 days. Performance of the meandering mobility based model according to 
those metrics are illustrated and explained in following subsections.  
 
4.6.1 Secure Connectivity 
Secure connectivity illustrates the probability of two neighbor nodes’ sharing 
common key. If it is 1.0 it means that all nodes in network can communicate with their 
neighbors. Then if this metric is nearly 1.0, then it shows that scheme is qualified. 
Figure 4.3 shows the graph of secure connectivity for meandering mobility based key 
distribution model. 
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Figure 4.3 Secure connectivity for meandering mobility based model 
As it can be seen from figure 4.3, connectivity fluctuates over time. Because of 
mobility, after a while nodes are dragged and start to drift away from its group. Then 
drifted nodes cannot communicate with their new neighbors due to the fact that they do 
not share any common keys with them. This is the reason for the decreases in the graph. 
However, underwater devices come to the help of the system and heal it. By the help of 
underwater devices, drifted nodes are connected to new neighbor groups and they start 
to communicate with those new nodes via new keys. In this way connectivity increases 
to 1.0. 
 
4.6.2 Resiliency against Node Capture Attacks  
 
Resiliency of the scheme against node capture attacks is measured by the 
following metrics: additionally compromised link ratio and total compromised link 
ratio.  As it is explained in 3.6.2, when nodes are captured by the attacker, he can also 
reach the keys and the links of these nodes. If captured keys are used in another place of 
the network then the attacker also compromises these additional links. In order to 
measure this, additional compromise links ratio is used (additional compromised links/ 
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all links). For the purpose of evaluating attacker’s overall activity, we measure total 
compromised links ratio (total compromised links/all links). Total compromised links is 
the sum of additional compromised links and the links of captured nodes. Figure 4.4 and 
4.5 show our scheme’s performances. 
 
Figure 4.4 Additionally compromised links ratio for meandering mobility based model 
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Figure 4.5 Total compromised links ratio for meandering mobility based model 
In our system we used Blom’s scheme for key distribution, which mean that all 
groups have λ-security. If captured number of nodes from a group exceeds λ, then 
attacker learns all the keys in the group, otherwise he cannot compromise any additional 
links. This can be seen in Figure 4.4.   In this simulation node per group is 30 and λ is 
10. Capture rate is determined as 15, 20 and 25 nodes per time unit. It is obvious that 
when 15 nodes are captured per unit time, additionally compromised links are nearly 0. 
If we increase capture rate to 20 nodes/unit time and 25 nodes/unit time, then simulation 
has perfect resiliency for a long time at the beginning of the simulation. After a while, 
the number of captured nodes of some groups exceeds λ, however it affects resiliency 
slightly and stays in reasonable level of 0,02. According to Figure 4.5, as it is expected, 
total number of captured links ratio increases when capture rate increases. When attacks 
power increases to 25 nodes/unit time capture rate, approximately 70% of links are 
captured.  
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4.6.3 Average Energy Consumption   
 
 In our simulations we measure energy consumption for key distribution. As 
nodes are battery-limited devices, it is important to have less energy consumption. We 
measure average battery consumption for the nodes at each instant of time. 
Communication between nodes and underwater devices are calculated to measure the 
battery consumption. Each packet is encrypted with AES which consumes 1.62 
µjoule/byte, and decrypted with AES which consumes 2.49 µjoule/byte. Also each 
packet (64 bytes) transmission consumes 70 milijoules. In view of those values Figure 
4.6 shows the average energy consumption per node for meandering mobility based 
model. Nodes do not separate from each other after unit time 40. For that reason, there 
is no need for fix up operation which results in no energy consumption. At the end of 
the simulation average energy consumption per node is converges to approximately 
1250 milijoule.  
 
 
 
 Figure 4.6 Average energy consumption per node for meandering mobility based model 
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4.6.4 Comparison with a Baseline Scenario  
  
In our meandering mobility based model, since some part of the communication 
is airborne, communication cost is decreased. In previous section we illustrate our 
model’s energy consumption performance.  In this section we also want to compare our 
model with a baseline scenario. In this scenario, all communication is in underwater, 
airborne communication is not utilized. Communication packets are transmitted hop by 
hop through nodes.  We did not use formal routing; instead packets are hopped in 
determined distances. In Figure 4.7, average energy consumption per node for baseline 
scenario for 20 meters /hop , for 40 meters/hop and our model are illustrated. As it can 
be seen if all the communication is done in underwater it will be much more costly. 
Also if the distance for each hop is decreased, average energy consumption per node is 
increased. The reason for this is more nodes are active to transfer the packet if distance 
per hop is decreased.   
 
 
Figure 4.7 Average energy consumption per node comparison with baseline model  
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4.6.5 Memory Requirements 
 
Since in proposed models Blom’s scheme is utilized, memory requirement for 
meandering mobility based model is also similar to nomadic mobility model. As it is 
also explained in Section 3.6.4, each node is loaded with its own ID, owing underwater 
device’ ID, a row of the private matrix   which has λ    elements, seed   for the 
generation of the public matrix and modulation number of  . The length of these values 
is the length of symmetric key which we assume it is 128 bits. Then total requirement is 
 λ         . Since in our simulation,   λ     , then total memory requirement is 240 
bytes. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
In this thesis, we proposed a key distribution scheme for underwater mobile 
sensor networks. We applied key distribution scheme for two mobility models. 
In Chapter 3, we introduce our key distribution scheme based on nomadic 
mobility model. This scheme is specialized for limited area in seashores. It is a three 
dimensional model with hierarchical structure that consists of group of nodes. We used 
Blom’s key distribution scheme for each group. We have also performed analysis for 
connectivity and resiliency. Secure connectivity is approximately 1.0 since the system 
heals itself by the help of the structure of the scheme. It also has approximately perfect 
resiliency for a long time at the beginning of the simulation. After a while, additional 
compromised links ratio slightly increases; however, it does not exceed 0.1 which 
shows that our system is very resilient to node capture attacks. Average energy 
consumption is also low, which is approximately 400 milijoule at the end of the 
simulation.  
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In Chapter 4, we adopted our key distribution model based to meandering 
mobility model. This mobility model is more realistic, since it depends on the 
movement of the ocean. This scheme is for large areas in kilometers. This scheme is a 
two dimensional model and has hierarchical structure. Blom’s key distribution scheme 
is also used for this scheme too. We performed simulations to evaluate metrics such as 
connectivity and resiliency. According to the structure of the system, secure 
connectivity pattern has zigzags. Due to the mobility, secure connectivity decreases in 
time. However with the help of fixing property of our scheme, secure connectivity 
reaches to perfect connectivity rapidly. In other words, our system heals itself.  Besides, 
additionally compromised links analysis show that our scheme is highly resilient to 
node capture attacks since it does not exceed 0.1. Also, average energy consumption 
analysis shows that energy consumption is low, which is approximately 1250 milijoule 
at the end of the simulation. 
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